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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
FLORENCE P. HO\VARD, also known as 
F. P. HOWARD, Deceased, 
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, LTD., 
as Administrator with the Will Annexed 
of the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, De-
ceased, and COLINA FERRIE, 
Appellants, 
-vs-
HELEN DUYS, ETHEL FORREST, 
ERNEST HOWARD, THE PROTESTANT 
BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS 
and McGILL UNIVERSITY, MILDRED 
BLACK, HILDA B L A C K , ROGER 
BLACK, RACHEL HELPS, and WALKER 
BANK & TRUST COMPAN~ a U~h 
Banking corporation, Executor of the 
Estate of Florence P. Howard, also known 
as F. P. Howard, Deceased. 
Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 8019 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Florence P. l-Ioward died in Montreal,_ Canada on the 
28th day of January, 1952. 
On Petition of Walker Bank & Trust Company, 
certain holographic documents, dated February 6, 1939, 
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2 
June 3, 1940, May 7, 1949 and January 14, 1952, were 
admitted to probate as the last will and testament of 
the said decedent. 
On November 15, 1952, Walker Bank & Trust Com-
pany filed a Petition to Construe Will, in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, known as Case No. 34386; 
National Trust Company, Ltd., as Administrator with the 
Will Annexed of the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, 
deceased and Colina Ferrie, filed an Answer to said 
Petition, as others did. 
Judge Clarence E. Baker (R. 140) had made an 
Order, in case No. 34386, consolidating for hearing the 
Petition to Construe Wills and the Contest of the Order 
Admitting Wills to Probate. 
Thereafter, Notice was given by the Executor that 
the Petition to Construe the Will and the Contest of the 
Order Admitting Wills to Probate, had been set by 
Judge Ray VanCott, Jr., before himself at 10:00 o'clock 
A.M. on the 19th day of January, 1953. (R. 123). 
After the consolidated hearing on January 19 and 
20, 1953, Judge Ray Y an Cott, Jr., made a Minute Entry, 
on February 10, 1953, which states, in effect, that the 
Motion for construction of wills having been heard on 
January 20, 1953, it is Ordered that the four instruments 
mentioned in the Executor's Petition to Construe the 
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the deceased, Florence P. Howard, and that all four wills 
are valid and constitute the will of the said deceased 
and should be administered as a whole, except in so far 
as they are irreconcilable as to particular bequests and 
each should be given effect in so far as possible. (R. 198). 
This was carried into paragraph 3 of the Findings of 
Fact, in said case No. 34386, signed by Judge Ray Van 
Cott, Jr., on March 23, 1953: 
"3. That said four ( 4) instruments above 
described, constitute and are the last will and 
testament of the said decedent, 'all subject to 
probate as such, except in-so-far as they are irre-
concilable as to any particular bequests, and said 
instruments dated February 6, 1939 and June 3, 
1940 were not revoked or superseded by the instru-
ment dated l\Iay 7, 1949." 
Before the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree were presented to the Court, Appellants 
herein Petitioned for, and were granted, on March 17, 
1953, the right to take an Intermediate Appeal to the 
Supreme Court, from the Order denying Appellants 
herein the right to intervene in the will contest, and the 
Supreme Court denied the Intermediate Appeal on April 
29, 1954. 
On May 14, 1953, Appellants filed Notice of Appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, from the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, dated 
March 23, 1953, and denial of a Motion for a New Trial. 
This Appeal bears the No. 8019. 
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Helen Duys, Ethel Forrest and Ernest F. Howard 
appealed from that portion of the Decree dismissing their 
contest, which Appeal bears the No. 8021, and said cases, 
8019 and 8021 were consolidated in this Court. 
The Record for consolidated cases No. 8019 and No. 
8021 is already in the Supreme Court, under Case No. 
7970. 
The Minute Order of February 10, 1953, construing 
the will, is carried over almost verbatim into the Findings 
of Fact, and the Findings and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment and Decree were a result of the consolidated 
hearing, wherein the Court, by its Findings, attempted 
to construe the instruments. Keeping in mind the Peti-
tion to Construe and the issues raised there as to whether 
any of the instruments are the will of the decedent and 
whether the last instrument is the will, the parties may 
be bound by this Judgment. 
57 Am. J ur, Sec. 1034, Page 670; 
Vol. 4, Page on Wills, Ch. 49, Sec. 1611, Page 602; 
69 C. J., Sec. 2052, Page 895. 
The Motion of intervention of National Trust Com-
pany, Ltd., as Administrator with the Will Annexed of 
the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, deceased, and Colina 
Ferrie, in the Contest, was denied and they were not 
admitted as parties to the Contest. They answered the 
Petition to Construe Wills and by the Findings, Con-
clusions and Decree therein, were made parties to the 
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Construction Judgment by Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr., 
and they are properly here on an appeal from such Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree. 
The single set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law are a culmination of the consolidated hearing and 
contain the attempt of the Court to construe the instru-
ments. 
The decision of Judge Van Cott on the Petition 
to Construe the Will and the Answers thereto, fails to 
find on the issues presented, and leaves to the discretion 
of the Executor not only the interpretation but the dis-
tribution. Unless this Court passes on the attempted con-
struction, there will be uncertainties and ambiguities 
even on distribution as to the will of the decedent, and 
the rights of the heirs and legatees will not be protected. 
Additional facts, which Appellants herein desire to 
set out, are contained in Appellant's Brief in Case No. 
7970, and particularly Point IV thereof, which facts are 
hereby incorporated by reference and made a part hereof. 
POINTS TO BE RELIED ON: 
POINT NO. I. 
THE FOUR INSTRUMENTS ARE SO INCONSISTENT 
AND IRRECONCILABLE, THEY CANNOT CONSTITUTE A 
WILL. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE INTENTION OF THE TESTATRIX WAS TO RE-
VOKE THE PREVIOUS INSTRUMENTS AND TO MAKE 
ONLY THE INSTRUMENT DATED JANUARY 14, 1952, HER 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. 
THE FOl,TR INSTRUMENTS ARE SO INCONSISTENT 
AND IRRECONCILABLE, THEY CANNOT CONS'TITUTE A 
WILL. 
Because this Point was fully presented in the Brief 
filed by Appellants in Case No. 7970, in Point No. IV 
thereof, Appellants refer to said Brief and said Point 
and cite to your Honorable Body, in addition thereto: 
In 1re Klewer's Estate, Nissen vs. Koch, (Calif.), 
268 p. 2d 544. 
57 Am. Jur., § 34 P. 58. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE INTENTION OF THE TESTATRIX WAS TO RE-
VOKE THE PREVIOUS INSTRUMENTS AND TO MAKE 
ONLY THE INSTRUMENT DATED JANUARY 14, 1952, HER 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT. 
The fundamental rule of interpretation and con-
struction in testamentary instruments is that the inten-
tion of the testator, gathered from the four corners of 
the instrument, shall govern. 
Section 74-2-2, UCA 1953. 
57 Am. Jur., Section 1135, p. 731, states: 
''All rules of construction are designed to 
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 
testator, for the very purpose of the construction 
of a will is to ascertain such intention. Accord-
ingly, while the courts are bound to have regard 
to any rules of construction which have been 
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established, it is to be remembered that rules and 
presumptions relating to the construction of wills 
are subordinate to the intention of the testator 
'vhere that has been ascertained or is ascertain-
able, and must yield thereto, however crudely or 
artificially the will may be drawn. Rules of con-
struction have their legitimate function when they 
are needed to understand the purpose intended 
to be embodied in the language used in the will. 
They take hold only where uncertainty commences 
and let go where it ends, and cannot control or 
vary the intent or properly prevent its execution. 
The one rule of testamentary construction to 
which all others are servient and assistant, it has 
been said, is that the meaning intended by the 
testator is to be ascertained and given effect in 
so far as legally possible. The testatorial inten-
tion will control any arbitrary rule, however anci-
ent may be its origin, and the various accepted 
canons of construction serve not so much to 
restrict or constrain the judicial mind as merely 
to aid or guide it in the discovery of the intention 
of the testator.'' 
In the case of In re Beal's Estate, 117 U. 189, 214 
P. 2d 525, the Supreme Court said: 
''The two rules of construction employed in 
the Hardie case have, in substance, been codified 
in this state. Sec. 101-2-1, U. C. A. 1943, provides: 
'A will is to be construed according to the 
intention of the testator. Where his intention 
cannot have effect to its full extent, it must have 
effect as far as possible.' 
Sec. 101-2-10, U. C. A. 1943, provides : 
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'Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is 
to be preferred which will prevent a total intest-
acy.' 
In the instant case, the express language of 
the will covers only two of three possible f'act 
situations respecting the time of the testator's 
death in relation to the time of his wife's death. 
Had the testator's wife survived him or had she 
perished with him in a common disaster, the 
testator's intent as to the disposition of the estate 
is clear. But the testator's intention in the advent 
of the death of his wife prior to his demise is not 
expressly made known nor can it fairly be implied 
from a language of the will. The rule of construc-
tion that the intent of the testator must be carried 
out does not authorize courts to make a new will 
to conform to what they think the testator 
intended, but the intent of the testator must be 
ascertained from the will as it stands. In re 
Estate of Sowash, 62 Cal. App. 512, 516, 217 P. 
123. Nor does the rule that testacy rather than 
intestacy is preferred relieve courts from the 
obligation to construe the language of the will 
according to the legal effect of the words used.'' 
. In re Klewer's Estate, (Cal.) 268 P. 2d 544, the Court 
said: 
"In the interpretation of a will, ascertain-
ment of the testator's intention is the fundamental 
rule of construction, to which all others are sub-
ordinate.'' 
Page on Wills, V·ol. 2, Ch. 22, Sec. 914, p. 789 and 
Sec. 916, p. 793. 
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In that respect, see 22 Ky. Law Journal 469, at page 494 
and 26 Georgetown Law Journal 786 (These Journals 
are in the University of Utah Law Library, but are not 
found in the Utah State Library.) 
The instrument dated the 14th day of January, 1952, 
starts out by the underlined words, ''Holographic Will,'' 
and the next sentence starts out: "This is the last will 
of me, Florence P. Howard." In that will she appoints 
Royal Trust Company, :.Montreal, as Executor, in col-
laberation with \Y alker Bank & Trust Company. In the 
1939 instrument, she appointed the Royal Trust Com-
pany, if she died domiciled in Canada, but the Guaranty 
Trust Company of New York City, if she died domiciled 
in the United States. In the 1949 instrument, she 
appointed "Walker Bank & Trust Company, Administra,.. 
tor and Executor of my estate" and the Royal Trust 
Company for Canadian administration.. In the 1940 
document entitled, ''Appended to holographic will,'' she 
said nothing about an executor. In e-ach C'ase, she began 
the document with the words "Holographic Will," except 
in the 1940 instrument, where she headed it, "Appended 
to holographic will." In the 1939 instrument and the 1949 
and 1952 instruments, she began the will by sfating, "This 
is the last will of me Florence P. Howard,'' or ''Florence 
Patterson Howard.'' 
In the 1939 instrument, she stated that after all 
bequests and expenses had been paid, the balance of the 
estate was to be divided among certain persons in 
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proportions. In the 1940 instrument, this division was 
changed. In the 1949 Instrument, the division again was 
changed. In the 1952 instrument, some of the persons 
getting certain 20ths were given specific bequests instead 
of a certain percentage and specific items were changed 
in bequests in many ways from one to another. 
See Sandford vs. Vaughn, 1 Phil. Eccl. Rep. 39, 
161 Eng. Reprint 907. 
It will be noted that in the 1939 document she said, "at 
the present writing, there is more than sufficient cash to 
cover the special cash bequests and expenses of the 
estate.'' 
In the instrument of 1952, many changes were made 
in the bequests of jewelry and other things. The manner 
in which the Testatrix changed the items and objects of 
her bounty, showed the intent of the Testatrix to revoke 
the previous instruments and to make a final will on 
January 14, 1952, which contained provisions wholly 
inconsistent with the former instruments, and the intent 
to revoke the former instruments. 
The inconsistences between the last instrument and 
the previous ones, show a desire to depart from the 
previous documents and the first three instruments are 
revoked in their entirety. !(~earns vs. Roush, 146 S.E. 
729, 15 Iowa Law Review 232. 
An examination of the original instruments shows 
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and a will, since she had written on the top of one page, 
"Codicil," although she had not written anything more 
than that. 
Appellants are limited in the amount of money avail-
able for writing a Brief in this matter, and therefore 
respectfully refer the Court to Point No. IV in the 
Brief filed by Appellants in the Case No. 7970, where 
the matter of the inconsistent disposition of the various 
items is fully set forth and which shows provisions in 
the 1952 instrument which are wholly inconsistent with 
each and all of the previous instruments. 
There is no hard and fast rule which requires the 
testator to dispose of all of his property. 
See Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, Ch. 15, Sec. 
464, p. 837 and Ch. 22, §927, p. 852. 
51 A L R p. 661, 664, 667, 668 and 675 and 683. 
There are three methods of revoking a former will 
by a later will: 1. Expressly revoking it, or 2. Dis-
posing of all property by second will, or 3. By provisions 
so inconsistent that the two cannot stand together. 
See 68 C. J., Sec. 491, page 803. 
We come under the latter. In the 1952 instrument, the 
Testatrix attempted to dispose of all of her property. At 
the bottom of the first page of said instrument is the 
statement, "If after taxes and estate expenses are paid, 
there is a surplus of over $50,000.00; I wish the above 
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cash (tax free) payments to be doubled, including 
$50,000.00 to Rosamond Lamb, Montreal.'' This must be 
given weight and the intention of the Testatrix must have 
been to dispose of her estate by the 1952 instrument. 
It was stipulated that the Testatrix had the three 
former instruments with her at the time she wrote the 
fourth instrument. In the case of Shiel vs. O'Brien, Ir. 
Rep. 7 Eq. 64, the Court held that if a person had an 
earlier will before him, and executed a second will, com-
plete in form, the intention of the testator was obviously 
to revoke the first. The fact that the entire estate was 
not disposed of is not governing against the intention of 
the testator. 
In re Wuppermam's Estate, 300 N.Y. Supp. 344. 
51 A L R '684. 
In re Bjor's Estate (Cal.) 229 P. 2d 468. 
As is said in the case of In .re Klewer's Est.ate, 268 
P. 2d 544, at page 546: 
''A testator has the right to make a will 
which does not dispose of all of his property, but 
leaves a residue to pass to his heirs under the law 
of succession. ***To say that because a will 
does not dispose of all of the testator's property 
it is ambiguous and must be construed so as to 
prevent intestacy, either total or partial, is to use 
a rule of construction as the reason for construc-
tion. A will is not open to construction merely 
because it does no dispose of all of the testator's 
property. 'Courts are not permitted in order to 
avoid a conclusion of intestacy to adopt a con-
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struction based on conjecture as to what the testa-
tor 1nay have intended, although not expressed.'' 
There can be no question but ·w·hat a will may be 
revoked by a later holographic will. 
In re Wallace's Estate, 223 P. 2d 284; 
Phillips vs. Smith, 100 P. 2d 244; 
In re Giff's Estate, 232 P. 2d 328. 
A later will may revoke a former will even though 
there is no express revocation of the former will. 
In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285 P. 299. 
The rationale underlying such a decision is the intention 
of the testator, as is said in Volume 1, Page on Wills, 
Lifetime Edition, at page 801: 
"Intention is said to be an act of the mind. 
To be operative as a revocation, this act of the 
. mind must be demonstrated by some outward and 
visible act of revocation, which must be one of the 
acts which are given in the statutes which regulate 
revocation by an act manifest on the face of the 
will.'' 
In the instant case, we submit that the intention of the 
Testatrix was to execute the will dated January 14, 1952 
as her last will and testament and to revoke 'all nrinr 
wills. The instrument of January 14, 1952 contains all 
the formal clauses necessary for a will, together with the 
dispositive provisions. While the words, ''This is the 
last will of me,'' is not conclusive in this case, it does 
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indicate the intention of the Testatrix, and together 
with the other indicies of intention shown in the docu-
ment, establish the Testatrix's intention that the last 
document, which she executed, was to be her will. 
Section 74-1-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states: 
''A prior will is not revoked by a subsequent 
will, unless the latter contains an express revoca-
tion or provisions wholly inconsistent with the 
terms of the former will; but in other cases the 
prior will remains effectual so far as consistent 
with the provisions of the subsequent will.'' 
The provisions of the instrument dated January 14, 1952 
are so wholly inconsistent with the provisions of the 
former instruments, that under the terms of our Statute, 
it revokes the former instruments. This Statute has been 
confirmed in re Love's Estate, supra. 
The Utah Statute provides that if a second instru-
ment contains provisions wholly inconsistent with the 
first, the second instrument revokes the first. The only 
time the second instrument does not revoke the first is, 
''the other cases,'' and then, in such event, the prior 
will remains effectual so far as consistent with pro-
visions of the subsequent will. The words contained in 
the Statute, ''in other cases,'' means cases in which there 
are no provisions of the second will inconsistent with 
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In re Lore's Estate, supra, Justice Harris stated: 
''The two documents here .offered as one will, 
are so completely inconsistent or antagonistic in 
their provisions, in that Exhibit 'D' undertakes 
to give all the residue of the estate to the Taylors, 
while Exhibit 'E' undertakes to give it all to the 
\Yilsons, that there appears to be no way that 
these could be constructed together as a part of 
a harmoneous whole will. On the contrary, had 
they both been legally executed, the former will 
would have been revoked by the later, even though 
there was no express revocation of the former 
will.,, 
In the instant case, the provisions of the last document 
are so inconsistent and antagonistic to the provisions of 
the former documents, that they cannot be construed 
together as a harmoneous whole, and on the contrary, 
show that the Testatrix intended to revoke the former 
instruments by the later. While it is true that in re 
Love's Estate it is stated that the whole residue in each 
will was given to different people, that is not the con-
trolling point. The residuary clauses were the inconsist-
ent dispositions in the case decided in re Love's Estate, 
supra. In the instant case, we have pointed out many 
examples of inconsistent dispositions of property, execu-
tors and the changing of legatees. 
The rule concerning a residual clause and the dis-
position of all of the testator's property is found at 
chapter 15, Section 464, page 837, Page on Wills, Life-
time Edition, Volume 1, wherein it is said: 
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"If the later will dispose of all of testator's 
property, and it remains in effect until testator's 
death, it necessarily revokes an earlier will. If 
the first will contains a residuary clause, and the 
second will attempts to dispose of all of testator's 
property, the second will operates as a revocation 
although it contains neither a residuary clause nor 
a clause of revocation. If the second will contains 
a residuary clause which purports to dispose of 
all of testator's property, the second will operates 
as a revocation of the first will, including specific 
legacies and devises therein.'' 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the Findings of Fact are not 
supported by the evidence and are contrary to the evi-
dence; that the Conclusions of Law are not supported 
by the Findings and are contrary to law and erroneous ; 
and that the Findings, Conclusions and Decree are so 
indefinite that the Executor will be requested to use his 
own choice and discretion as to what the instruments 
mean. That the Court did not find on the issues pre-
sented by the Petition to Construe and the Answers 
thereto. That the Judgment of the Court is contrary to 
law in that all instruments are admitted as the will 
instead of the 1952 instrument being held to be the last 
will. 
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The Court should order that the costs of Appellants 
on this Appeal be paid out of the assets of the estate, 
pursuant to Sec. 75-14-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. F. LAZIER of LAZIER AND LAZIER, 
JOHN D. RICE, JAMES E. FAUST, J. 
LAMBERT GIBSON, and CLEON B. 
FEIGHT, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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